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sary is said to be largely a question for the jury.20 Here the rule is
very confusing. Force amounting to killing or seriously wounding the
tortfeasor should not be permitted and this is believed to be the law.
In conclusion it may be said that the law as to the right to defend
property, although seemingly well settled, is in reality somewhat in
confusion. As has been previously stated, the courts seldom base their
decisions on defense and protection of property alone. It is believed
that reliance solely upon protection of property as a defense in a crimi-
nal or civil case is impossible as a matter of law, except under situations
coming within the recognized exceptions.
ANNE H. WooDs
CREDITORS' RIGHTS-JUDGMENT LIENS AND PBIORITIES
IN KENTUCKY
An important problem relating to rights of creditors is to determine
when a judgment creditor acquires a lien on the property of a judg-
ment debtor and the effect of such acquisition. Especially perplexing
is determining the priorities of liens between the judgment creditor
and other creditors and purchasers. An effort will be made to formu-
late from Kentucky statutes and decisions the correct procedure to be
followed by the judgment creditor who desires to secure his judg-
ment by obtaining and perfecting a lien on the debtor's property. The
reader is advised, however, that the information gathered from the
statutes and cases may be supplemented beneficially by an examina-
tion of lower court records in particular communities, because rela-
tively few cases pertaining to this subject have reached the Court of
Appeals.
There are divergent views in different jurisdictions as to the exact
time when a lien on property of the debtor is created in favor of the
judgment creditor.1 This diversity can be attributed to the fact that
the creation of liens is now almost universally based upon statutory
law. In order to determine the proper procedure to be followed by
the judgment creditor, it is necessary to examine the applicable statutes
of the state in which the judgment is rendered. Not only do statutes
' Garner v. State, - Miss. -, 2 So. 2d 828 (1941); State v. Terrell, 55 Utah
314, 186 P. 108 (1919).'For a general discussion of the various state statutes and interpretations see
31 Am. Jun. 16 et seq.; 1 GLENN, FRAuDuLx CoNvEyANcEs AND PEFERENCES
37 et seq. (1940).
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differ as to the extent of protection afforded by the lien and as to the
time of the creation of the lien, but also as to whether real and per-
sonal property should be treated alike for this purpose. Many states
have statutes which provide that the rendition of the judgment itself
constitutes a lien on real property.2 Other state statutes provide that
only when the judgment is docketed and properly recorded does it
become a lien on real property.3 Most of these states distinguish be-
tween real and personal property and require more than the rendition
and docketing of the judgment to create a lien on personalty.4 How-
ever, in a few of these states no distinction is made between real and
personal property.5 In those states which hold that the judgment does
not create a lien on either realty or personalty but require a writ of
execution, both are commonly treated in the same manner and the
same execution is used.6
The Kentucky requirement is in accord with the latter group as to
both real and personal property of the debtor. The pertinent statutory
provision is:
"(1) An execution against property shall bind the estate of the
defendant only from the time of its delivery to the proper officer to
execute. The officer to whom the execution is delivered shall, on
receipt of it, endorse thereon the day, month, year and time of day
of its receipt by him."
Under this statute it seems that when the creditor has taken his writ
of execution to the proper official8 who endorses it, a lien is validly
'1 GLENN, FRAu uLENT ComrmvANcxs AND PREFErenCEs 40 (1940). For
example, PA. STAT. tit. 12, see. 868 (Purdon 1936).
S11 GLENN, FnAxmuLENT CONVEYANCEs AND PREFERENCES 40 (1940) states:
... the rule, in Massachusetts and some other New England states, [is]
that a judgment is not a lien upon the debtor's land, but all other states have laws
that make every judgment, when docketed in a book provided for that purpose a
lien upon the debtor's land . . ., binding all subsequent purchasers." Kentucky,
however, fundamentally follows the New England rule, note 7, infra.
' 31 Am. Jun. 23, for example PA. STAT. tit. 12, see. 2291 (Pardon 1936).
'1 HANNA AND MAcLACHLAN, Cmwrrons' BiGHTs 10, n. 2, for example
ALA. CODE tit. 7, secs. 585, 588 (1940).
'See Ky. REV. STAT. sec. 426.130 (1948). "Property shall be liable to levy
and sale under execution in the following order: first, personalty; second, land."
"Ky. REV. STAT. sec. 426.120 (1) (1948). This execution statute might be
considered the same as the statutory provision for attachment liens in Ky. CODE
CIrv. PRAc. ANN. sec. 212 (Carroll 1948): "An attachment binds the defendant's
property in the county which might be seized under an execution against him, from
the time of delivery of the order to the sheriff, in the same manner as an execution
would bind it ...." Thus it would follow that attachment liens may be treated in
the same manner as execution liens in determining the time at which they become
binding on the property of the debtor. "A lien of attachment is the same as an
execution lien. Brown's Adm'r v. Gabbart, 232 Ky. 336, 23 S.W. 2d 551
(1930).
"Se Ky. CODE CIV. PRA.c. ANN., see. 667 (Carroll 1948): "(1) Every process
in an action or proceeding shall be directed to the sheriff of the county; or, if he
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created against the debtor's interest in his property, both real and per-
sonal. For most purposes the decisions of the Kentucky Court have
so held.9
In 1903, the court rejected a judgment debtor's contention that
there was no lien upon his property because the sheriff had failed to
inventory and appraise the property and thus had failed to levy the
hen, and held that the lien was nevertheless valid from the time of
delivery of the writ of execution to the sheriff.'0 Its position was re-
iterated in a 1940 case, the court holding that the moment the execu-
tion was placed in the hands of the officer for levy and collection a lien
was created on the debtor's property to secure payment of the judg-
ment." Of course, a notable exception to this general rule is found
in the case of a writ of execution or order of attachment delivered to
the officer with orders to delay levy until further instructions. In such
a case, the execution or order is not considered delivered for practical
purposes until the date the officer is ordered to levy.
12
The remaining problem under the Kentucky statute is the extent
of protection afforded the creditor against third party interests. This
problem seems to be divided into two phases: (1) protection against
other execution creditors, i.e., priority of liens, and (2) protection
against subsequent purchasers.
In determining priorities of liens, it is not difficult to conclude that
the first execution delivered and levied by the officer obtains priority
over subsequent liens. The difficulty arises in the following situation.
"S" creditor takes a writ of execution to the sheriff and has it endorsed
at 2:00 p.m. on January first. "J" creditor has a writ against the same
defendant endorsed at 8:00 p.m. on the same day by the deputy
sheriff. The deputy acts quickly and levies the junior execution of "J"
immediately; the sheriff levies the senior execution of "S" later in the
afternoon. The court has repeatedly held that "J"s junior execution
be a party, or be interested, to the coroner. Executions must be directed to
and executed by the sheriff, unless he is a party or is interested. See Gaudy v.
Sanders, 88 Ky. 346, 11 S.W. 82 (1889).
'The creditor's interest can extend no further than the interest of the debtor,
I GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCEs 41 (1940). The lien,
even after its perfection, will not attach to defeat one ivho has a prior equitable
interest in the land. Boswell v. Kirby, 12 Ky. Opn. 412 (1884). An exception
this general rule is when the court finds that the prior equity is one which has not
been exercised and is urged for the first time after the creditor's judgment. Griffin
v. Gingell et al., 25 Ky. Law Rep. 2031, 79 S.W. 284 (1904). The lien will never
defeat the holder of a prior mortgage which has been properly recorded or of
which the creditor has actual notice at the time he acquired the lien. Jett v.
Sheets, 10 Ky. Law Rep. 197 (1888).
" Richart v. Goodpastor, 116 Ky. 637, 76 S.W. 831 (1903).
U Fannins Exr v. Haney, 283 Ky. 68, 140 S.W. 2d 630 (1940).
"Hood v. Pope, 233 Ky. 749, 26 S.W. 2d 1043 (1930).
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becomes a prior lien because it is first levied.13 The result is that the
execution which was last delivered and endorsed will be first satisfied.
This creates an unfortunate situation because the diligent "S" creditor
loses the prior lien through actions which were completely without
his control. However, even if these decisions prevail, and the value of
the debtor's property is only great enough to satisfy "J"s lien, "S" is
not necessarily without remedy. The sheriff has a statutory duty14 to
levy first those executions which he receives first, and thus "S" may be
compensated through the bond of the sheriff, if it is found that the
sheriff acted negligently in levying the junior execution first.'5 It might
be added that when two executions come into the sheriff's hands at
exactly the same time, he shall apportion the amount realized from the
debtor's property according to the amount of the judgment of each.16
The second phase of the problem pertains to the protection af-
forded the holder of the lien against subsequent bona fide purchasers.
The mere creation of a lien on the property of the debtor does not
protect the holder against subsequent purchasers for value without
notice of the lien.17 In order to afford himself such protection against
a purchaser of real property, the creditor must comply with the pro-
cedure for filing a notice of lis pendens which is:
"No action . . . or any lien ... shall in any manner affect the right,
title or interest of any subsequent purchaser, lessee, encumbrancer of
such property, or interest for value and without notice thereof,
except from the time there is filed in the office of the county clerk of
the county in which such real property or the greater part thereof lies,
a memorandum stating:
(a) The number of the action, if it is numbered, and the style
of such action or proceeding and the court in which it is com-
menced, or pending;
(b) The name of the person whose right, title, interest in or
claim to real property is involved or affected;
(c) A description of the real property in the county thereby af-
fected."-8
In the case of personal property the creditor is not protected against
a subsequent bona fide purchaser until a levy has been made, because
I C.T.C. Investment Co. v. Daniel Boone Coal Corporation, 58 F. 2d 305
(E.D. Ky. 1931); Million v. Commonwealth, 40 Ky. 810 (1841); Tilford &
Anderson v. Burnham & Ewell, 37 Ky. 109 (1838); Kilby v. Haggin, 26 Ky. 208
(1830); Arberry v. Nolan, 25 Ky. 421 (1829).
"Ky. REy. STAT. sec. 426.120(2) (1948).
"See Million v. Commonwealth, 40 Ky. 310 (1841).
"Ky. Rex'. STAT. see. 426.120 (3) (1948): "If two or more executions come
to an officer's hands at the same time and he is unable to make the amounts
thereof, he shall apportion the sum made among the several executions so coming
to his hands according to their amounts."
"Roark v. Bank of Fountain Run, 184 Ky. 109, 211 S.W. 561 (1919).
"Law v. Skaggs, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 1292, 105 S.W. 439 (1907).
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the lien before that time is general in nature and not specifically bind-
ing upon any particular property.19
In conclusion: a writ of execution delivered to the proper official
and properly endorsed by him (1) creates a lien upon the property of
the debtor against whom the execution was issued (2) protects the
creditor through priority of lien against subsequent writs of execution,
except the subsequent execution which is first levied (3) protects the
creditor against bona fide purchasers of real property only after the
creditor has filed a lis pendens notice.
NonmA D. BosTm
CECIL V. FARMERS NATIONAL BANK-TERMINATION OF
LIMITED DIVORCES
In Cecil v. Farmers National Bank' the Kentucky Court of Appeals
had before it a very novel and interesting question. The suit was
brought by an alleged widow to establish a right of dower. She had
married the deceased in 1941, but had obtained a divorce from bed
and board from him in 1943. A property settlement by which the
plaintiff accepted $2,000 from her husband "in full settlement of her
distributive right in his estate" was incorporated into the separation
decree. Six months later the parties became reconciled, moved to
another town and lived together as man and wife until his death in
1949. Neither of the parties ever petitioned for an annulment or modi-
fication of the separation decree. The question before the court was:
did the reconciliation of the parties, who thereafter lived together as
man and wife and so held themselves out to the general public be-
lieving that it was unnecessary to remarry, annul the separation decree
and set aside their agreement wherein she relinquished her dower in
his estate? The court held that it did not. However, they further
stated, "this does not mean they could not mutually rescind their
property settlement incorporated in the divorce judgment." Thus, the
court sent the case back to determine the question of rescission.
The court was undoubtedly sound in holding that the parties
could not by mere reconciliation and subsequently living together as
man and wife abrogate the decree of limited divorce. The Kentucky
Statutes permit the granting of a divorce from bed and board for any
' C.T.C. Investment Co. v. Daniel Boone Coal Corporation, 58 F. 2d 305
(E.D. Ky. 1931).
1245 S.W. 2d 430 (Ky. 1952).
